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I 
One of the most clearly delineated descriptions of the relation between nihilism 
and the death of God in Nietzsche’s published works belongs to On the Genealogy of 
Morality (from now on, GM)2. On the one hand, its main argument describes nihilism 
as an event: since the ascetic ideal of moral truthfulness has been logically exhausted 
with the disappearance of the ultimate guarantor of its world-denying aspirations, 
modern décadence unleashes the world into a void of despair and disorientation3. In 
what constitutes a crisis of values, then, nihilism appears as consequence and 
symptom of the radical devaluation that the death of God represents, yet as history 
another perspective on nihilism opens: one that takes this paralyzing épuisement of 
the will experienced in European culture since the advent of modernity and only 
exacerbated in Nietzsche’s time as more fundamentally related not to the will to truth, 
but to the will to nothingness.  
Parallel to the will to truth’s relation to the modern self-abolition of values, let 
us recall another of GM’s central arguments on nihilism. The will, lacking a goal after 
the surplus of suffering brought about by the earliest debtor-creditor relations, 
confronts the meaninglessness of suffering and imposes a life-denying moral meaning 
on it. The will now has a goal: it chooses to will nothingness instead of suicidal nihilism 
(GM II, 21; III, 1, 14, 28) —in other words, to continue willing even if through a 
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paradoxically reactive, self-dividing, self-devaluing willing of nothingness that, as 
active and creative force (GM, II, 12), is also a will to nothingness. Here, it is as 
valuations built on world-denial that values devaluate themselves, thus appearing the 
willing of nothingness as the very logic of nihilism. No longer merely le mal du siècle or 
even a history-breaking depletion of voluntaristic resources4, “nihilism can basically be 
nothing else but the will to nothingness” (Müller-Lauter, 1999, p.45), a logic of 
decadence in which moral values develop according to a “process of wasting away that 
leads to self-destruction” (p.49). 
Even before questioning the worth of that nihil that always refers back to being, 
Nietzsche’s imagery for the event and history of nihilism has a decidedly, if not 
problematically, naturalistic tone. More importantly, if according to a theory of forces 
decadence comes when subordination to a ruling drive breaks down and finds as its 
command a will to disintegration and self-destruction5, then Nietzsche applies this 
same approach to other misarchic symptoms of the historical sickness: from socialist, 
feminist and anarchist ideas to modern science, decadent art, Russian novelists or 
French psychologists. Or as The Case of Wagner reverses a formula from Bourget and 
the naïve priority it still assigns to organic totality, consider literary decadence, where, 
following a similar will to disintegration, “life does not reside in the totality any more. 
The word becomes sovereign and jumps out of the sentence, the sentence reaches out 
and blots out the meaning of the page, the page comes to life at the expense of the 
whole” (CW, 7)6.  
Since literary fragmentation was indeed for Nietzsche a symptom of modern 
nihilism, this makes the work of Maurice Blanchot particularly appropriate for a return 
to the problem. For facing the will to truth the abyssal emptiness of a godless universe 
—the impossibility of accounting for itself without losing its moral faith in truth to the 
play of extra-moral illusion—, language in its autonomy ascends as the space of 
meaning and non-meaning, but also of that which exceeds, subverts and suspends the 
dialectical logic of their opposition. Language, in sum, does no longer speak about 
“truth” through a “subject”, so while to the Nietzschean question “who speaks?” 
Foucault replies, echoing Mallarmé, “the Word itself” (2005, p.417), Blanchot, maybe 
more radically still7, writes about a language deprived of any ruling presence guiding 
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its movement, yet still answering, this freed writing, to a demand rather different than 
that of logos.  
The present work is a commentary on the problem of nihilism as it appears in 
“Réflexions sur le Nihilisme”, the sixth chapter of Blanchot’s 1969 work L’Entretien 
Infini (The Infinite Conversation, from now on, IC) and part of his “most substantial 
explicit analysis of nihilism” (Weller, 2008, p.103). Of course, Blanchot soon abandons 
the notion out of its philosophical sterility, so studying his reasons will shed light on 
the positive interest he has in Nietzsche. Indeed, since the critique of nihilism —and 
with it, of notions still too compromised with ontoteology like its overcoming or the 
meaning and possibility of the Übermensch— guides “Reflections” until Nietzsche et 
l’écriture fragmentaire, its third, final part and the chapter’s core philosophical 
discussion8, our next section will focus on its key arguments as they relate not only to 
nihilism’s meaninglessness, but also to the introduction of what Blanchot considers to 
be Nietzsche’s actual radical challenge to thought. Consequently, section III will 
investigate Blanchot’s notions of difference, writing, and the para-ontological 
temporality of return that the latter also opens, relating their connection with death 
and its impossibility to an ongoing discussion on the deeply problematic role that 
Heidegger’s thought and interpretation of Nietzsche have for Blanchot. In section IV, 
and with a broader perspective on Blanchot’s nihilism in “Reflections”, we will sum up 
concluding aspects of his appraisal of Nietzsche but with particular interest in the 
relation they might have with the different way the latter also interpreted the crisis of 
nihilism. 
Finally, there are clear problems in using such a specific text for a partial 
approach that nevertheless aspires at wider systematic conclusions —to name just 
one, the neglecting of Blanchot’s later return to Nietzsche in 1973’s Le Pas Au-Dela. 
Yet to insist on these problems in a world of becoming, interpretation and chance 
seems useless, as if the “true” text, approach or system were still goals for thought to 
desire, as if the world were something beyond the fables written about it.  
 
II 
Although the opening section of “Reflections on Nihilism”, Nietzsche, 
aujourd’hui, deals with the ways Schlechta, Jaspers, Löwith and particularly Heidegger 
had tried to correct Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche’s obscene betrayals of her brother, the 
question in need of reflection is already introduced in its first paragraph: nihilism 
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“retains all its historical, political, and literary vigor”, yet also, “and even because of 
the verifications time accords it”, seeming “almost naive and like the still tranquil 
dream of a ‘better’ age” (IC, p.136). This ambivalence soon gives way to a provisional 
interest in the concept’s fruitfulness, not as a philosophical or literary cliché but as that 
which is implied by knowledge. Indeed, as the final passages of this opening section 
show, it is as if the dangers of modern science justified a contemporary interest in 
nihilism, thus leading us to return to Nietzsche’s thinking and contradictions, the latter 
also our contradictions, as his contemporaries refused to hear what Blanchot voices as 
his avertissement: “Those who want science must also want the consequences of 
science, and must therefore in the end want nihilism” (p.143). 
On a first glance —and aujourd’hui, when we suddenly “perceive that the 
danger to which knowledge exposes us is not the danger of a style and when, at the 
same time (with what hypocrisy), we endeavor to preserve all the advantages of 
science, but […] refusing its risks” (p.143)—, it is science what makes a return to the 
Nietzschean problem necessary. Since science, says Blanchot, “is the meaning of a 
world deprived of meaning”, the nihilism that makes it possible also allows it to make 
nihilism, absolute nothingness, possible in return. Blanchot’s verdict on science is 
clear: “[this] means that, by it, the human world can perish” (p.146). 
Yet as Nietzsche, today closes and the next section begins, scientific nihilism 
gives way to nihilism as historical break, being the origin of this dégradation “that 
turning point in the history of the world from which the light of the divine has 
withdrawn” (p.144). In fact, in the first pages of Passage de la ligne Blanchot’s double 
strategy is both to restrict his approach to nihilism as an historical event following the 
death of God, and to attribute to Nietzsche, not without reason, the kernel of his own 
subsequent critique of the concept, suggesting he had finally conceived it as “an 
extreme that cannot be gotten beyond and yet [as] the only path of a true going 
beyond, the principle of a new beginning” (p.144). Thus, although as a crisis of value it 
“can no longer move us, so familiar has it become” (p.144), as the principle of a new 
beginning, the “infinite negation that withdraws from us every solid foundation”, 
nihilism still seems to imply an “intoxicating task”: “the sudden opening on a space of 
unlimited knowledge” (p.145). Blanchot thus offers a première approche to nihilism as 
“an event accomplished in history that is like a shedding of history—the moment when 
history turns”, as well as its negative and positive traits: “values no longer have value 
in themselves”, “for the first time the horizon is infinitely open to knowledge” (p.145). 
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But the opening of an infinite space for knowledge collides with modern man’s 
mediocrity: “Present-day man is man of the lowest rank, but his power is that of a 
being who is already beyond man” (p.147). This tension will lead to a discussion on the 
particular willing that characterizes the Übermensch, but not before a main reason to 
drop the term “nihilism” is covertly introduced, it being closely related to the reason 
why overhuman willing is ultimately aporetic. An early footnote says about nihilism: 
“The word itself is flat. Turned into a system, it contradicts itself. The contradiction 
only brings out its dryness. The semantic play between nothingness [le neant] and 
nothing [rien] shows that it is apparently difficult to negate what has not first been 
affirmed” (p.451, n.6, translation modified). Nihilism, to deny absolutely, implies 
something which, in being denied, is being previously affirmed. More than just a latent 
systematic contradiction, “the term’s lack of density” (p.451, n.6) is rooted in it being, 
and we will return to this, “an unreliable and questionable, because still ontological, 
concept” (Hill, 2012, p.261, n.46)9. 
A further analysis of this enigmatic, already fading presence that lurks in the 
impossibility of nihilism is what the Übermensch will open. Following Heidegger’s 
already influential interpretation, Blanchot describes it as “the being who has overcome 
the void (created by the death of God and the decline of values), because he has 
[found] in this void the power of overcoming” (IC, p.147). As Blanchot then suggests 
ambiguities within an image of the Übermensch he himself is not sure of, his final 
version will betray aspects that relate to Heidegger in a more complex, unsaid manner 
than the text’s understated acceptance of him as “the only person capable of defending 
a true philosophical reading of Nietzsche’s work” (Holland, 1996, p.179). 
“Reflections” introduces the will to power as the quoted description of the 
Übermensch goes on to question the contradictory status of the end it is supposed to 
represent —the opposition end or accomplishment being a false problem of ontology, 
as we will finally see in relation to Blanchot’s critique of the present in the name of 
return. If the Übermensch is the goal, it stops self-surpassing itself, stops being the 
Übermensch; but if it is not the goal and hence also in need of something to surpass, 
then its will shows not to be “free of all external meaning; his act of willing […] still a 
Will to Power” (p.147). This idea, the will to power as depending on external meaning, 
carries its own conclusion: “The overman is he in whom nothingness makes itself will 
and who, free for death, maintains this pure essence of will in willing nothingness” 
(p.148). Sounding farther from a Nietzschean, more tragically-inclined conception of 
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the fleetingness of physis than from Hegelian or Heideggerian philosophies of post-
Christian finitude10, Blanchot not only suggests that the Übermensch might not 
represent the overcoming of nihilism but its “very form” (p.148), he also describes the 
positive essence of the will as will to nothingness. Freed from external limitations, 
then, the will wills nothing for willing something would be equal to a voluntary self-
denial of that newly-found overhuman possibility.  
Three things should be kept in mind here since they will guide our final 
perspective on Blanchot’s nihilism in “Reflections” —before returning to them, of 
course, a proper treatment of Blanchot’s interest in force as difference, fragmentary 
writing, and the impossible present that the thought of return objects to the thought of 
being is imperative. Notice first the blurring of Nietzsche, Hegel and Heidegger in 
Blanchot’s notion that a (human) will freed of limitations equals a will freed from 
negation, and the latter a paradoxical will to absolute negation. A certain Kojevian 
conception of negation as the historical motor of human activity thus turns the 
conflictual becoming of forces into the rational unfolding of logos, the logic of 
resentment into the labor of negation11, and the overcoming of nihilism into the end of 
history: a line to be crossed. Second, Blanchot’s text punctuates the (overhuman) 
equation of the will and the will to nothingness with a reference to GM’s previously-
discussed passage on the will willing nothingness over instant suicidal escape in the 
face of horror vacui (GM III, 1, 28), yet while Nietzsche clearly distinguishes suffering’s 
meaninglessness from nothingness as meaning, he also distinguishes the latter from 
the will to power. As Blanchot also seems to follow Kojève in taking nihilism as logically 
equal to suicide12, it is important to insist in GM’s triple distinction between suicide and 
the willing of power and nothingness, for the self-refutation of the ascetic ideal implies 
for GM, and Nietzsche’s thought in general, the urgency of announcing the recently-
opened possibility of a new goal for modern humanity other than, say, Mainländer’s 
suicidal surrender to entropy or Schopenhauer’s all-too-theistic atheistic pessimism, a 
modernized version of previous asceticism. 
So the contradiction that is nihilism led us to the one in the Übermensch, both 
overcomer and world-denier; this will lead to Blanchot’s later analysis of eternal return 
as giving access to another thought in Nietzsche, one that is irreducible to his 
hypothetical system, its inconsistencies, or its vulnerability to Heideggerian charges. 
More than a mere logical contradiction, then, a deeper Blanchotian argument against 
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nihilism might still appear. For now, however, a final dimension of his reading of willing 
as willing nothingness needs to be highlighted, for perhaps the main issue is not 
Blanchot’s take on the latter as a Nietzschean notion. Perhaps his account on nihilism, 
“more essentially a debate with Heidegger” (Hill, 2012, p.33), is also marked by the 
latter in subtler ways than the text’s explicit references to his reading of Nietzsche or 
dialogue with Jünger. 
Seeing in the will to power the last stage in the history of metaphysics, 
Heidegger not only coincides in neglecting the Nietzschean distinction, he does so as a 
consequence of his reframing of the will to power into the accomplished metaphysical 
subjectivism grounding the radically world-negating calculus of total planetary 
domination. Simply put, since the will to power consummates metaphysics’ own 
essence of forgetting being, the very idea of nihilism as will to nothingness becomes 
trivial: the “true” world finally becomes, indeed, a fable, as “the closing off of the truth 
of beings […] from the truth of Being […] appears as a liberation from all metaphysics” 
(Heidegger, IV, p.239). Far from agreeing with the will to power as the thought of the 
being of beings once reduced to their crudest ontic presentation —he would differ with 
the idea of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician13 while not even being entirely in line 
with ontological difference14—, Blanchot’s treatment of the Übermensch, in equating 
the willing of power and nothingness in a way that challenges every distinction made 
by Nietzsche even if it is far from the worst contender to dilute nihilism by attributing 
such a gesture to him15, seems to follow not only a Heideggerian reading of the 
Nietzschean figure16, but also a broader, “implicit union between ontological nihilism 
and axiological nihilism” (Ferraris, 2000, p.23, my translation). Thus, we must proceed 
with attention to Heidegger’s lurking presence and larger influence in Blanchot’s overall 
assessment of Nietzsche’s philosophical significance. 
For example, it may be against a Heideggerian connection between eternal 
return and accomplished metaphysical subjectivism that Blanchot says that the human 
impossibility of willing backwards marks the failure of the Übermensch. In return, 
“[p]ersonal and subjective all-powerfulness is transformed into the impersonal 
necessity of ‘being’” once the will that wills nothing wills eternity and, “in this process, 
eternity, without either will or end, returns to itself” (IC, p.149). But we have seen the 
dialectical contradiction of willing nothingness: negation implies affirmation. It leads 
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Blanchot to question the entire link between nihilism and nothingness since the former 
is rather “tied to being. Nihilism is the impossibility of being done with it […]. It says 
the impotence of nothingness […]; it tells us that when we think nothingness we are 
still thinking being. Nothing ends, everything begins again” (p.149). So the true 
problem of nihilism does not coincide with a logic of decadence —the will to 
nothingness as a reactive, hence perpetually self-devaluating, willing of power— but 
with the very terms structuring the logical discourse on nihilism: being and 
nothingness as dialectical opposites. It is when confronted with the impossibility of 
total negation, and thus of ascribing back to that being that resists it the ontological 
consistency initially ascribed to nothingness’ negation, that nihilism crumbles, for it is 
not the willing of nothingness but the thinking of being17. So the Übermensch is not the 
thought “most able to enlighten us as to the kind of trap that nihilism is”, for the latter 
“surpasses itself absolutely by making itself definitively unsurpassable” (IC, p.148). 
Maybe Nietzsche’s challenge to the thought of being is how he diverts, and not how he 
fails overcoming, this ungraspable gap between nihilism exacerbated and overcome18. 
Similarly, against a Heideggerian account on the Übermensch as the man of 
complete technical domination —but also minimizing previous concerns with le monde 
humain péri that science produces—, this “weakness of the negative”, appearing “in 
the being that cannot be negated, lays waste at one stroke to our attempts to 
dominate the earth and to free ourselves from nature by giving it a meaning—that is, 
by denaturing it” (p.149). While resisting the dialectical thought of nothingness while 
still justifying a Hegelo-Kojevian turn in which Nietzschean denaturalization is taken for 
a meaning-giving Aufhebung —another line to be crossed as the very possibility of 
crossing seems more and more doubtful—, this being that ruins nihilism marks the 
undecidable nature of the latter’s “end”. As Blanchot says following Heidegger’s 
rebuttal of Jünger: “either passage into the nullity of nothingness or into the region of 
a new turning of being” (p.150). This allows us to conclude: conceived the thought of 
return as the overhuman affirmation of nihilism, the entire problematic appears as 
aporetic, insofar as it is tied to an ontology that is, at worst, unquestioned —for what is 
the status of this being that nihilism fails to deny?—, and at best, obsolete —for 
undeniable being wrecks being’s very opposition to nothingness. 
Both logical contradiction and ontological impossibility, the sterility of nihilism 
thus calls for a displacement of ontology. As Crossing the line approaches its end, 
Blanchot follows Heidegger in acknowledging the need to start writing these terms as 
                                                             
17 cf. Weller (p.105). 
18 cf. Hill (2012, p.198-199), Heidegger (II, p.182). 
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being or nothingness (p.150), but also in seeming to assume a Heideggerian critique of 
the naïve “realist efficacy” of taking man as “a passerby who would have only a 
geographical relation with what he crosses” (p.150). Since the entire dialectical 
comprehension of overcoming neglects that man is himself “this zone and this line”, it 
seems as if an existential analytic is what “Reflections” will propose as the much 
needed novel approach to nihilism. Yet Blanchot’s move, as we will now study, is 
rather to recover the thought of return in relation to that which in Nietzsche exceeds 
even the questioning of tradition —for contestation “keeps one within the horizon of 
the same interrogation” (p.150). A “very different language” calling him, now it will be 
the Nietzsche of a fragmentary écriture d’effraction who will assume “an exigency of 
rupture that […] turns him away from what is in his power to think” (p.151), but also 
who —indirectly, through the unsaid relation between the return of difference as the 
temporality of writing and death as an un-crossable line shattering the supposed unity 
of authentic existence— will help question Heidegger’s own commitment with the 
ontological discourse of light and its absence. Before returning to the still pending 
significance of nihilism as will to nothingness, we must turn to Blanchot’s proper 
interpretation of Nietzsche. 
 
III 
The title Nietzsche and fragmentary writing already introduces the question of a 
different Nietzsche than what systematic reconstructions propose. On the one hand, 
“[e]ven disengaged from a unitary system and engaged in an essential plurality”, his 
“thought must still designate a center”, even if the interpretation that holds it is “a 
philosophy of interpretation”. But Blanchot’s interest lies elsewhere, outside the 
question of the coherence of Nietzsche’s thought, “if it is dialectical or antidialectical, if 
it ends metaphysics or replaces metaphysics” (p.151). Which doesn’t mean he neglects 
a proper analysis of Nietzschean conceptuality. In a dialogue with recent 
commentators —Derrida or Deleuze, for example, but also Klossowski—, force, 
repetition and difference will serve to localize a Nietzsche “dissymmetrical […], 
irreducible to any conceptual programme” (Hill, 2012, p.34). Indeed, since these 
notions respond to a certain voiceless exigency in Nietzsche’s writing, Blanchot will 
now aim at that towards which they point to, “without ever being able to formulate it 
as such: that which thought is constrained to think once it leaves itself behind, without 
relinquishing itself, and strains or reaches towards the outside” (p.35). This makes 
Nietzsche not only his fundamental predecessor on the theme of the fragment (p.26), 
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but also synonym with the very form of temporality that authorizes the ascent of 
language and, more radically still —as through it language’s complicity with being is 
suspended—, writing19. 
Nietzsche and fragmentary writing thus implies “a very different language: no 
longer of the whole but of the fragment, of plurality, of separation” (IC, p.152). 
Outside the logic of the whole also means the whole of philosophy20: philosophy 
completed with the Hegelian system as undetermined being and nothingness infiltrate 
the Nietzschean dead-end at the end of philosophy. So it is not a question of the 
aphoristic style, but of a “surplus of affirmation” (p.154) cut off from the work of 
negativity or the presenting light of being, what Blanchot suggests with + +, a 
notation that both subtracts and adds. Does this make + + a representing notation? 
Like Blanchot himself, Nietzsche too is aware “he is obliged to think from where he is, 
[…] to speak on the basis of the discourse he is challenging” (p.153), thus the will to 
power and eternal return think the multiple, yet “in relation with the one, still a 
multiplied affirmation of the One” (p.153). Like + +, however, “fragmentary speech 
does not know contradiction” (p.154) but difference: a juxtaposition of texts escaping 
simultaneity in relating to each other by the “indeterminate blank that neither 
separates nor unites them but brings them to the limit they designate, which would be 
their meaning —if, precisely, they did not thereby, hyperbolically, escape a speech of 
signification” (p.154). 
So Blanchot returns to the fatally-flawed thought of eternal return, only now 
with renewed interest in the way its impossible affirmation can be turned against 
metaphysics not to create an opposing anti-metaphysics —maybe a “philosophic 
pluralism” (p.154) or “a philosophy of ambiguity, [of] the experience of being as 
multiple” (p.155)—, but to displace its center. Blanchot revisits the Übermensch: it 
signifies the disappearance of man, “he whose essence is disappearance”, also of 
“successful man, […] wherein everything, the whole, is realized”, but also of man as a 
whole, “the being in whom the whole in its becoming has become being” (p.155). 
Nihilism, thus, signifies not a devaluation of the moral value of truth in relation to 
which “one can accommodate oneself to”, but the question of thought “when being —
unity, the identity of being— has withdrawn without giving way to nothingness, that 
too easy refuge” (p.156). And it is here, where devaluation is demoted in the name of 
the definite retreat of being, that eternal return manages to differ from the latter’s 
                                                             
19 cf. IC (p.xi-xii), Hill (2012, p.197). 
20 cf. p.xii. 
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history, for its affirmation is the decision to affirm chance, difference not predicated in 
the one or its multiplicity, Dionysus reborn and perpetually fragmented.  
But what is the exact relation between the thought of return and the writing of 
the fragment? It is not enough to state that a plural speech that talks not of meaning 
or its absence echoes the chance-affirming thought that also affirms itself, and 
infinitely, as aleatory21. Blanchot’s current analysis is rather aimed at the common 
exigency heard both in writing and return. Since ontology cannot settle if man 
disappears or if its overcomer comes —the very distinction between the resented past 
and the affirmed past yet-to-come being undecidable—, intermittent speech talks out 
of that unbridgeable between, that “moving tear of time that maintains, one infinitely 
distant from the other, these two figures wherein knowledge turns” (p.158). Outside 
Hegel, but also outside Hegelianized Nietzsche22, the empty accomplishment of logos’ 
affirmation of the all leads not to the apory at the end of the history of being, but to 
the lack of a present in which to even enunciate that everything returns as itself 
another temporality23. Thus, this infinite rupture that return introduces between past 
and future —this “non-present temporality of the present” (Newman, 1996, p.164)— is 
also the time of a writing that, cut-off from the self-identical unity of meaning, 
demands to be always already-written, always yet-to-be. And if neutral time displaces 
being and meaning from their presence as affirmed or denied, it must also displace 
subjectivity from its self-presence. 
As Klossowski’s 1969 book Nietzsche et le Cercle Vicieux closely suggests, the 
very truth of return needs its forgetting in order to continue to reverberate through 
eternity. Hence, it does not mean subjectivity accomplished but its aleatory 
disappearance, which means a contradictory, impossible teaching24. Having translated 
Die Fröhliche Wissenschaf but also Heidegger’s two-volume Nietzsche, Klossowski must 
have known his reading had critical consequences towards Heidegger’s. Something 
similar occurs in Blanchot’s work of the same year: the differing time of repetition 
decenters subjectivity from itself, yet this decentering does not seem to repeat the 
theme of ecstatic temporality, but rather to interrupt it by focusing on its constitutive 
“space of dis-location” (IC, p.156) —almost as if eternal return, not only surviving its 
interpretation as a subjectivist, metaphysical doctrine, actually illuminated Sein und 
Zeit’s previous residual metaphysics of presence, for if returning non-present 
                                                             
21 cf. p.167-168. 
22 cf. p.157. 
23 cf. Fynsk (2013, p.186). 
24 cf. Klossowski (1997, p.55-73). 
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challenges a reading of eternal return as the (essentially incoherent) last thought of 
the totality of beings25, it must also challenge the role death had in disclosing the 
structural whole hidden in inauthentic existence. 
Indeed, while Sorge, “Dasein’s primordial totality of Being” (SZ, §39)26, is 
phenomenologically testifiable during anxiety’s relation to death as Dasein’s innermost 
possibility of impossibility27, one might say that the Nietzschean Stimmung does not 
result in the disclosure of a thought of (merely ontic) totality28. Perhaps the limitless 
experience of return constitutes a different temporality than Dasein’s, perhaps an 
eternal Augenblick in which Dasein’s self-referring totality is as volatilised as it is 
disclosed in anxiety —circular normativity thus being excluded from the vicious circle of 
repetition29. Or perhaps, more radically still, Blanchot’s Nietzsche shows Being and 
Time’s enduring reliance on the dialectics of limits, crossings, and what the latter offer 
to vision. If so, eternal return would open said reliance to the outside of being and its 
light, not contesting an antithesis but silently evoking the thrust of Heidegger’s own 
1927 critique of Kant and Descartes, as anxiety bares Sorge in the present presence of 
its meaningful unitary totality.  
Although some of these issues will return in Blanchot’s later Le Pas Au-Dela, 
and we will return to them as the temporality of writing displaces a certain naïve 
opposition of life and death still present in Heidegger, the third part of “Reflections” 
mounts the tensions between Nietzsche, Heidegger and Blanchot’s own altering 
repetition of them. His new questioning of Heidegger occurs as he approves the idea 
that return belongs to the same —return thus saying “the being of becoming” (IC, 
p.159)—, while also adding the difference that repetition brings when the same returns 
as the same. Now, since the fragmentary interrupts all discourse by drawing it outside 
its faith in logos, Blanchot accepts it may “seem to play the game of nihilism […]. And 
yet how far it leaves this power of negation behind” (p.159-160). Exactly how far: at 
the possibility of thinking the will to power no longer as a metaphysical principle, but 
as that which “does not allow itself to be understood either as clarity or as form” 
(p.160). Indeed, having Nietzsche realized that being is light30 —thus moving away 
from the Apollonian “value of form […] in the face of an obscure Dionysian terror” 
                                                             
25 cf. Hill (2012, p.67, 201). 
26 cf. §45, §64, §65, §82. 
27 cf. §53, §62. 
28 cf. Hill (2012, p.66). 
29 cf. Hill (p.203). 
30 cf. p.162. 
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(p.160)—, he thinks a will whose puissance does not equal pouvoir nor “dominating 
violence”, but force. Force, therefore, would escape light. 
But how to think force, if chaos already refers to order? Citing Deleuze’s recent 
Nietzsche et la Philosophie, Blanchot declares that force is always said as multiple, for 
its very being is plural. Yet, he adds, “[t]he plurality of forces means that forces are 
distant, relating to each other through the distance that […] inhabits each of them as 
the intensity of their difference” (IC, p.161). Privileging Deleuze’s idea of distance 
insofar as differential element of force31, this intimate exteriority of forces appears not 
as “a tranquil spatial and temporal continuity”, but as a disjunction “where time and 
space […] rejoin by their mutual disjoining”, instituting “relation on […] an interruption 
that does not bring together” (p.161). Difference is then redoubled as its very differing 
also defers: this leads Blanchot to conceive becoming not as “oriented homogeneity” 
but as “the play of time and of space”, so just as the experience of return marks 
repetition as difference and vice versa, Nietzsche’s interest in force proves to be aimed 
at supporting “the presentiment that difference is movement” (p.162). Becoming, 
then, is the “‘common’ field” (p.161) where space is dissymmetrical, time is 
distraction, and speech is interruption, which means, in sum, that force really says 
movement, movement says difference, and “difference, essentially, writes” (p.162). 
Or so Blanchot says “[o]ne must conclude”. This conclusion appears as 
inevitable insofar as force has been quietly abandoned for risking “an apparent 
dogmatism” (p.162), just as its parallel status as the genetic element of Deleuze’s take 
on the will to power was previously ignored, and just as perspectivism too needs to be 
criticized for reproducing the “imperialism of light” (p.162). This allows Blanchot to 
renew his critique of nihilism: “invincible as long as, submitting the world to the 
thought of being, we entertain and seek truth on the basis of the light of its meaning, 
for it is perhaps in light itself that meaning is dissimulated” (p.162). The problem of 
nihilism, as we have been studying, is ultimately being as light, the latter hiding in the 
illumination of what it discloses, being this absence “infinitely more obscure than any 
obscurity” (p.163). This makes light’s deception actually double: it hides in its clarity 
the mediated status of what it discloses as immediate, while also hiding itself as this 
mediating clarity. Now, both as mediation and as the immediate, Nietzsche too held a 
double suspicion against the true, and it means his proper position against the thought 
of being: thinking “the world in order to free thought […] from the idea of being […]: in 
                                                             
31 cf. Deleuze (1983, p.39-72). 
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order […] to think something other than what for it is possible. Or, again, to speak in 
saying this ‘more’, this ‘surplus’ that precedes and follows all speech” (p.163-164) 
Nietzsche does not think being when he thinks the world —or at least when 
turning himself over to the exigency of the fragmentary32. Blanchot goes on to explain 
that being, meaning, value and light have validity within the world, while the latter 
itself “cannot be thought, cannot be said as meaning or as a whole […]. The world is its 
very outside: the affirmation that exceeds every power to affirm […] in the 
endlessness of discontinuity” (p.164). Thought as will to power, then, the depth of the 
world escapes the thought of being by being eternally disjointed both from itself and 
from that which light permits to unveil. Even more, far from “an integral subjectivism”, 
the will to power is an infinite unfolding of interpretation “without subject and without 
complement”, a Dasein without Sein, a mere there in which interpretation, infinity and 
the world “can only be given in a juxtaposition that […] does not put them in relation, 
and that thus responds to the exigency of fragmentary writing” (p.164). 
The will to power as a Dasein sans Sein —a “neutral movement of interpreting” 
(p.165) exterior to the space of meaning and its “dialectic of illusion” (p.163)— recalls 
Deleuze’s defense of Nietzsche in the face of its Heideggerian interpretation: 
“Nietzsche is opposed to every conception of affirmation which would find its 
foundation in Being, and its determination in the being of man” (1983, p.220, n.31). 
Yet Blanchot’s para-ontological acceptance of the will to power —only reluctantly: 
“world” outside “being”— rather mirrors Derrida’s 1967 eager offering of Nietzsche to 
Heidegger until the naivety of a metaphysical critique of metaphysics is “almost lost for 
the question of being” (1997, p.19). It is there, says Derrida, that Nietzsche “regains 
[his] absolute strangeness, where his text finally invokes a different type of reading, 
more faithful to his type of writing [as] not originarily subordinate to the logos and to 
truth”. If, as we have seen, the impossibility of nihilism leads to the impossibility of 
refuting “[t]he commentator who Hegelianizes Nietzsche” (p.157), it now becomes 
clear that, for Blanchot and for Derrida, what cannot be refuted is the one who 
Heideggerizes Nietzsche, precisely in order to announce that which would mark the 
failure of such a procedure —for Nietzsche too “wanted to write”, suggests Derrida 
against Heidegger, “the history of metaphysics as the epoch of presence” (p.143). In 
any case, being writing that which resists Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche as 
“captive of that metaphysical edifice [he] professes to overthrow” (p.19), the latter’s 
                                                             
32 cf. p.163. 
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real problem according to Derrida is also closer to Blanchot’s next argumentative steps 
in Nietzsche and fragmentary writing.  
Beyond the affinity of Blanchot’s Nietzsche to Derrida’s, his distance from 
Deleuze has direct consequences for the continuing analysis of nihilism as an 
ontological pseudo-problem. Since Blanchot has explicitly said of forces that “‘the 
differential element’ […] is the whole of their reality” (IC, p.161), there is no value 
given to the distinction between active and reactive forces —in fact, Deleuze’s sûre 
remarque warning not to think the relation “of one force with another […] as a 
negative element” (p.161) has been sidestepped from the start by the systematic 
consideration of the reactivity of the will as negating determination33. This means 
Blanchot cannot follow a notion of Nietzschean nihilism in which, since force is also the 
genetic element of the will to power —the latter having always been, in Deleuze’s anti-
Hegelian reading, a thought of non-dialectical self-disjunction—, its reactive weakening 
must lead to a becoming that is foreign to what can be apprehended on the basis of 
Hegelian or Heideggerian conceptions of the relation between logos and being. 
However, since Blanchot has been clear in that force risks the dogmatism of light, we 
must defer, at least until we have read “Reflections”’ entire argument, any discussion 
of the theoretical consequences of, for example, his reluctance to build an univocal 
ontology on returning difference34 —a Deleuzian idea of immanence being foreclosed 
for perhaps being assumed to suppose an ontological language which would speak of a 
living present in the past, just as transcendence would speak of one in the future35. In 
any case, Blanchot’s ongoing argument now leads directly in the core of his reading on 
the impossibility of nihilism.  
If “to interpret: the infinite: the world” (IC, p.164) can even be said to “mean” 
that the world is a text, this precludes a vulgar idea of the latter as meaningful. But 
that the world is not a text given to meaning does not lead, on its part, to a naïve 
mysticism of mute plenitude; it rather leads to laughter at the fragmentary writing that 
disrupts its disclosure, at the fact that —even taking Twilight of the Idols’ well-known 
criticism of the metaphysics of grammar into account— mundus est fabula. Still, what 
could this reference to the world as fable mean? Perhaps that the ruptures turning 
language, “the metaphor of a metaphysics” (p.166), into a writing that does not say 
the world to a subject lead to the seul destin not of having to perpetually fail at 
overcoming “nihilism in the guise of reason” (p.166), but of having to make language 
                                                             
33 cf. p.147. 
34 cf. Hill (2012, p.252, n.75). 
35 cf. Hill (2012, p.203). 
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persist: “to speak without end, and in accordance with the exigency of difference, 
always [deferring] speaking” (p.167). As the introductory note to IC says: “writing is 
called upon to undo the discourse in which, however unhappy we believe ourselves to 
be, we […] remain comfortably installed. From this point of view writing is the greatest 
violence, for it transgresses the law, every law, and also its own” (p.xii). 
Blanchot proceeds to characterize this “writing of effraction” (p.168) as an 
affirmation of chance that manages to free the neutral enigma of writing “so that, in 
writing itself, it might expose itself as the very enigma that writing maintains”. He then 
asks if man does not have to disappear for such écriture sans discours to arrive, yet 
we know the dead-end to which such a question leads. Furthermore, the question is 
even less significant once we add the idea that “the Universe (that which is turned 
toward the One) [safeguards] the truth of human presence”. As “Reflections” suggests 
—in an essential point that constitutes a quite different position from a fragmentary 
Nietzsche merely juxtaposed to the completed whole of tradition—, there is a rational 
cosmos as unitary whole, but only because it appears under “the submission to light 
that human reality represents when it is presence”. This must be distinguished from 
the “very different ‘time’” of writing’s unreachable obscurity, “such that the difference 
that governs it unsettles, disconcerts, and decenters the very reality of the universe —
the universe as a real object of thought”. Thus we have: man, Universe, God and any 
guarantee of the truth of the world as illuminated by meaning; and on the other hand, 
that “speech without traces wherein writing nonetheless calls us” to return to the 
enigma of an infinite poursuite-rupture. We might call this incompatibility, following 
Heidegger’s suggestion in the distance it advices, Blanchot’s dual ontology36. 
“World” as “text” versus world as fable: as Blanchot contends that the entire 
philosophical issue of nihilism belongs to the first alternative —and even then it ignores 
its grounding in the thought of being—, it is destined to fail. Yet we can still make 
further precisions on the Blanchotian meaninglessness of nihilism. As “Reflections” 
approaches its end and the light of presence is distinguished from the traceless speech 
of writing, the “text” that would be the metaphor for the world —itself another 
metaphor— is defined as “the movement of writing in its neutrality” (p.168). This 
neutrality has come up before and it is now, with Blanchot’s discussion of punctuations 
signs as paradigms of the ontological dislocation of écriture, that we can examine it. As 
a paradoxical entry into its elucidation, however, let us be aware that terms like those 
used to describe writing, or “writing” itself, “still belong to the preliminary discourse 
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that at a certain moment has allowed them to be put forward” (p.168). That positing, 
on its part, arranges these mots juxtaposes through “signs that are modalities of 
space, and that make space a play of relations wherein time is at stake: we call these 
signs of punctuation” (p.169). As these empty discontinuities indicate temporal 
rhythms —accents, scansions, pauses—, it is clear they do not replace sentences as 
carriers of meaning. In fact, not representing any absent meaning “except the void 
they animate without declaring it”, Blanchot states that “[t]heir value is not one of 
representation”; rather, these pure differences bearing “the non-identity of the same, 
the movement of distance” (p.170), articulate the void as meaning via voids that 
suspend meaning, hence, just as was the case with + +, not posing terms “as though 
the alternative of positive and negative, the obligation to begin by affirming being 
when one wants to deny it, were here, at last, enigmatically broken” (p.169). 
Ultimately, then, punctuation signs show writing’s neutral movement outside the onto-
logic of affirmation, negation, or the being that negation cannot but presuppose as 
already affirmed.  
So the neutrality of the fragmentary precludes the possibility of asserting being 
as present or absent. But if nihilism cannot be overcome for there will always be 
something to spoil absolute negation, how to comprehend this present being that 
writing, meanwhile, shows as impossible? We have seen how in the thought of return 
what returns is the present moment as already gone or yet-to-come, thus interrupting 
the whole of past and future with a finite interval that opens to an undialectizable 
infinite. Although this is not the place to discuss a neuter that will return in 1973’s Le 
Pas Au-Dela —along with related topics as the il y a or “the interminable suspension of 
dying which no experience in the present can comprehend” (Hill, 2012, p.210)—, it is 
still worth to say something about the peculiar experience of writing as its connection 
to return has been established, and better yet if we can refer to the passive 
temporality of death that literature entails outside of “Reflections”’ argument. For as 
Haase and Large have said, every literary work “struggles to reinvent language once 
again. This singular experience is the experience of the anonymity of language that 
seems to be spoken by no one, and which Blanchot calls the neuter” (2001, p.80). 
Now, since we have merely alluded to the role of death in Blanchot’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche, a few comments on the issue, but also on negation and 
literature, are necessary37. In Heidegger, we have seen how the unitary totality of 
existence that comes to the fore with world-crumbling anxiety can lead to the 
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appropriation of death, meaning that the radically singular possibility of impossibility 
can be put to work towards Eigentlichkeit. In Hegel, and particularly in Kojève’s 
anthropologico-existential interpretation, death as pure negativity permits the very life 
of language and consciousness, death being now put to work for the dialectical 
unfolding of historical Reason itself. The negative labor of language is thus related to 
the mastery of death. As Hill says before quoting Blanchot’s early La Part du Feu, 
“death is the source of the negativity that separates sign from object […]: ‘It is 
therefore entirely accurate to say that when I speak,’ as Blanchot puts it, ‘death 
speaks in me’” (Hill, 1997, p.113). 
But as the temporality of writing outside time structured around the present, 
eternal return challenges these all too philosophical conceptions of death. Even more, 
the experience of dying as literature incarnates it not only questions the rational 
optimism of submitting death to the ends of Geist or Dasein, it also denounces —in 
writing as an exigency that is not addressed to subjectivity since it rather kills it, in a 
Nietzschean death that radicalizes the death of the thing that the Hegelian logos brings 
about in order to turn it into a concept— the philosophical notion of death as opposed 
to life, even as a possibility of life38. In other words, if death not only belongs to 
language but also to its subject as her self-presence is incompatible with writing39, 
death stops being an event of life —for example, the Heideggerian limit to existential 
possibilities that posibilitates a resolute appropriation of finitude—, and this for two 
reasons. First, because there is no present in which it can be said that death has 
occurred: death is, from this perspective, an unsurpassable limit, or following the 
Blanchotian formula against Heidegger, not the possibility of impossibility but the 
impossibility of possibility. Second, because the impossibility of death testified in 
écriture’s impossible present “deprives me of the power to say ‘I’” (Haase & Large, 
2001, p.53). Once again against Heidegger —and confirming the critical consequences 
towards Being and Time we extracted from Blanchot’s eternal return—, this other 
death rather means an impersonal, disappropriating and meaningless experience of 
otherness. “The philosophical notion of death, then, hides behind its persuasiveness 
another more essential death, which is not the ground of my own authentic existence” 
(p.48)40. 
Although Blanchot’s avoidance of dialectics forbids the construction of a 
“theory” of dying that would be opposed to Hegelian or Heideggerian versions, a 
                                                             
38 cf. Rose (1996, 194-197). 
39 cf. IC (p.168), Weller (2008, p.90). 
40 cf. Weller (p.100-101). 
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systematic consequence of his distance from death as negativity or from proper death 
is its consideration as a limit that cannot be located nor crossed, so not properly death 
as event but rather a dying. The same occurs with the limit that nihilism implies: 
following what we saw as Blanchot’s reading of its real significance41, the question on 
how to overcome the definite retreat of being from thought loses its grip. The entire 
logic of beginnings and endings —or, for example, birth and death as the two “limits” 
of natural life— belongs to an ontology of presence in which that which begins and that 
which ends can be clearly seen under the light of the present moment. On the other 
hand, however, the uncrossable nature of the present means that the arrival of 
absolute nothingness has not yet occurred since anonymous and neutral being 
persists, while at the same (yet differing) time, the possibility of overcoming the 
nihilism of being through the passive experience of writing overlaps the impossibility of 
nothingness42. Nihilism may then lead ontology to apory, but it also leads to a 
receptivity to that infinite neutrality that constitutes ontology’s impossible —because 
decentered from presence— center. 
Without past nor future but also without subject, in the thought of return one is 
forever outside ontology even if being persists, just like during the interminable time of 
dying “one is forever dying but not dead” (Haase & Large, p.52). Now, if Heidegger —
to cite one authoritative proponent of the thesis— is correct in that there is an 
essential unity between eternal return and the will to power, one should not jump to 
conclusions and condemn Blanchot for naming “death” what Nietzsche considered “life” 
—see, for example, Blanchot’s quote about the law of return implying a state of 
perpetual death in Hill (2012, p.208). At this point this would be a hasty conclusion as 
both writers tried to pass beyond the binary of life and death as each other’s limits. 
More importantly, it is necessary to comprehend that this “experience of dying 
permeating life” (p.54) in the eternally differing time of fragmentary speech constitutes 
a demand to a subject whose intermittent dissipation precisely precludes an active 
response. The paradox of Nietzsche’s teaching: trying to grasp this ungraspable 
exteriority to ontological language by passively responding to its exigency through 
persistent, differing writing.  
At the very final paragraph of “Reflections on Nihilism”, Blanchot unequivocally 
states that difference “can only be a difference of speech, a speaking difference that 
permits speech, but without itself coming directly to language —or coming to it and 
then referring us back to the strangeness of the neutral in its detour” (IC, p.170). In 
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Nietzsche, and as the incoherent thought of return tried to grasp, it is his writing as 
writing —or on his own writing, to use Derrida’s indication (1997, p.19)— what 
Blanchot considers possesses the complicity with interminable death that, more 
broadly, is also literature’s. As language carries its own outside short-circuiting its ideal 
as a representational mean of communication and knowledge, literature pushes writing 
to that “divergence on the basis of which begins, without beginning, [its] pursuit-
rupture” (IC, p.170). Thus, seeking to answer —through an always deferred answer— 
the demand coming from outside of the language of presence, literature experiences 
anonymous and neutral alterity by responding to the exigency of writing through the 
most passive passivity —an experience structurally analogical with mourir to the point 
that literature, indeed, “has made a pact with death, it is itself an experience of death, 
of an extreme passivity” (Haase & Large, p.56). This relates to the notion that, in the 
end, what the world as fable might mean is not some silly post-modern relativism of 
the world as its descriptions, but the interminable yet interrupting dislocation by which 
the very idea of “world” becomes a written fable: the One precariously held together 
by the between-two, the world having its very ontological centering —whether as being 
or nothingness— perpetually decentered by the eternally differing écriture needed to 
sustain it.  
 
IV 
Or mundus est fabula in a double sense: being, meaning, unity, light, universe 
and God as written fables, but on the other hand, their writing itself as pointing to the 
experience of literature, the passive movement by which interminable dying disturbs 
the ontology of being as presence and meaning as its absence, by reminding them of 
their status as fables. To put it differently, if a notion like Blanchot’s double ontology 
has a minimum of interest it may lie in seizing the ambiguous movement of writing by 
which being and meaning, but also their negating absences, are left as ontology’s 
concern, while that very movement forever keeps presence crossed out with an 
exigency from outside the language of being that is impossible to apprehend with it, at 
least without killing the discreet neutrality of the il y a under the light of ontological 
affirmation —hence literature’s privileged access to the eternally recurring temporality 
of mourir in its unworkable meaninglessness over philosophy’s interest in negativity for 
the production of sense. 
Yet we have seen how a nihilism disjointed from being a mere shaky application 
of ontology insists in the margins of Blanchot’s dismissal of the notion, and hence our 
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concluding remarks cannot but try to make sense of the significance of Blanchot’s 
nihilism being haunted by this other nihilism, the will to nothingness. Indeed, if our 
concern continues to be the Nietzschean notion of the will to nothingness and its 
unspoken relation to Blanchot, and if the double ontology we concluded with is built on 
a radical critique of (the aporetic ontology behind) nihilism as Blanchot grasps it 
through Hegel and Heidegger-inspired readings of Nietzsche, then the exact point in 
which both issues can be put into discussion is, precisely, the gesture by which the 
Blanchotian world of ontology becomes fable and its relation to the specific perspective 
on nihilism that, as outside its Hegelian or Heideggerian comprehensions, Blanchot 
systematically neglects. 
This justifies our lack of interest in Blanchot naming mourir the exact 
temporality that Nietzsche ascribed to the essence of life, an interesting topic 
regardless of the necessity of excluding from its development naïve conceptions of life 
and death. For although Blanchot’s insistence in language as the power of negation, 
however put in question by écriture, may open a “Nietzsche turned inside out: […] not 
so much that God is dead as that death is God” (Bruns, 1997, p.45), Blanchot is too 
aware that any such inversion would play the game of nihilism in a way which would 
recall Heidegger’s worst criticisms of the emptiness of a Nietzschean inversion of 
Platonism. Closer to our interest, on the other hand, Weller suggests that it is nihilism 
that which haunts writing, yet his notion of nihilism is based on the idea of eternal 
return as “the nihilist thought par excellance” (IC, p.148) insofar as it exposes the 
failure of ontology to answer —not to mention grasp— undeniable, non-present 
neutrality. In other words, Weller’s proposed “possibility that nihilism cannot in fact be 
located safely outside the literary” (2008, p.94) —a possibility criticized by Hill through 
a mere repetition of the very notions Weller attempts to problematize in Blanchot43— 
still assumes the nihilism that would be écriture’s uncanny guest in its Blanchotian 
characterization, that is, as it is inspired by Hegel and Heidegger. Thus, Weller points 
to Blanchot’s own symptomatic relation to nihilism and his need to keep writing 
uncontaminated by it, but through a confrontation that insists in giving more 
importance to the ontological naivety of nihilism than to what eternal return could say 
about its inescapabilty44. 
Our interest, however, lies elsewhere: not in the Blanchotian idea of nihilism 
that would haunt his own idea of writing and hence the clear line between them, but in 
the nihilism that, as we have seen, is silenced in several ways during “Reflections”: in 
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Blanchot’s highly idiosyncratic reading of GM’s treatment of the will to nothingness or 
the way it agrees with Heidegger’s blurring of the distinction between willing power 
and willing nothingness, but also in his problematic relation to Deleuze’s Nietzsche, in 
his broad dismissal of force, in the precise consequences this has in relation to the 
question of reactive becoming, and even in his early minimization of the philosophical 
relevance of the scientific annihilation of the world. So how to even begin to draw the 
contours of a possible relation between Blanchot and the nihilism he refuses to 
consider? 
Mundus est Fabula: On a purely textual level, it is highly suggestive that 
Blanchot’s only use of the formula is juxtaposed to a reference to Twilight of the Idols, 
whose brief chapter “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable”, as we have 
alluded, has a special place in Heidegger’s overall Nietzsche interpretation. In fact, as 
Ferraris has indicated, it is not “irrelevant that the multiple thematizations of the 
conversion of the world in fable in the post-modern age have started from [the] 
Heideggerian version of the apologue from Twilight of the Idols” (2000, p.23). As he 
then characterizes the aftershocks of Heidegger’s reading, the devaluation of values is 
conjoined with the disappearance of being, axiological nihilism is read as ontological 
nihilism, and the world is thus subjected, at the dead-end of metaphysics implied by 
Heidegger’s Nietzsche, to an aestheticist fableization that Ferraris also calls the 
“dematerialization of the world” (p.23)45. Meanwhile, he suggests, Nietzsche had an 
altogether different goal: to disassociate nihilism as the problem and fate of human 
valuations from ontology as the problem and fate of being, hence disabling the 
question of the latter’s meaning46.  
This would mean Nietzsche sidesteps the question that SZ §3 posed as previous 
to any ontology. Even more, man’s relation to being cannot be his starting point —
recall Deleuze’s position—, since the will to power was never a thought of the being of 
entities. Having never had much to do with dialectics nor ontological difference, 
Nietzschean pluralism rather breaks through Blanchot’s convenient dismissal of it as a 
philosophy of “the experience of being as multiple” (IC, p.155, my italics). Indeed, as 
the canonical §36 of Beyond Good and Evil makes clear, Nietzsche assumes one type 
of causality —i.e., one type of “being” constituting forces but also their paradoxical 
self-displacing from ontological stability, as Blanchot’s analysis of difference showed—, 
yet as non-totalizable plurality that causality of the will precludes any notion of the will 
                                                             
45 cf. 27. 
46 cf. p.69. 
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to power as a unitary metaphysical principle47. Kleinherenbrink’s defense of Deleuze 
from critics such as Badiou could perfectly apply here as a defense of Nietzsche from 
the classic Heideggerian charges: if we wish to insist on calling Nietzsche’s philosophy 
an “ontology”, its unique character would rather lie in it being “neither an ontotheology 
nor a metaphysics of presence” (2019, p.38). Consequently, reversing Heidegger’s 
accusation of subjectivism one could read his resistance to take conflictual pluralism to 
the letter as a symptom of the deadlock that is an interpretation of Nietzsche that “can 
be adequately thought only […] on the basis of the fundamental experience of Being 
and Time” (Heidegger, III, p.189). 
But if we have been clear in that Blanchot does not follow many aspects of 
Heidegger’s thinking and appropriation of Nietzsche, we have also insisted in the 
gestures that seem to follow his reframing of nihilism as ontology. In fact, when 
Blanchot dismisses devaluation because he has read it through the categories of 
ontology only to then substitute it for the problem of the demand of writing as that 
which reveals ontology as a disjointed set of fables, he may well be criticizing the 
history of being, but he is also being consistent with, for example, Heidegger’s 
paradigmatic refusal to follow Nietzsche Contra Wagner’s formula aesthetics as applied 
physiology —for seeing natural processes as perspectival valuations would be 
“reducing [herabsetzen] art to […] gastric juices” (I, p.93), complains Heidegger, 
unaware of the way his materialist conception of natural becoming reproduces the 
same “wanting to halt before the factual” (GM, III, 24) that Nietzsche criticized in 
modern scientific asceticism. In sum, perhaps it all depends on the meaning of the 
Nietzschean “fable”, since there is a fundamental difference between the ontological 
world being turned into a fable, world, and Nietzsche’s true moral world as that which 
becomes a fable and subsequently opens the world as will to power —a world that, as 
Blanchot noted, is already disjointed from being. 
From a Nietzschean perspective, then, Blanchot’s faux pas does not primarily lie 
in using Hegel or Heidegger to read Nietzsche. For in answering the question “who 
speaks?” with the obscure neutrality of language, Blanchot disregards the will to power 
as Nietzsche’s own answer, only in its eminently conservative mode, an answer “taken 
not from metaphysics but from animal physiology: the herd instinct speaks” (quoted in 
Schrift, 1995, p.29, 46). This marks Blanchot’s accurate retrieval of the will to power 
as the differing dislocation of the ontological “world” as, nevertheless, misleading, 
since as “Reflections”’ last paragraph insists, the locus of that dislocation always 
                                                             
47 cf. Müller-Lauter (p.20-21, 130-133). 
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already belongs to language. While the case can be made that the body is the true 
locus of the will to power as conflictual dynamism48, more important still is what the 
primacy given to textuality against nihilism as an ontological dead-end misses. This is 
not only that sacrificing Nietzsche to Heidegger in order to then find the temporality of 
writing as the operation’s remainder might be redundant —since Nietzsche wasn’t what 
Heidegger said he was, and since much of what characterizes the movement of 
écriture already characterized the will to power. Crucially, what the priority of 
textuality misses is a radical implication of the nihilism as will to nothingness 
hypothesis, that is, that the history of ontology as that which ends in its status as 
ontology —enclosed thought haunted by the impossible outside that is literature— may 
just be an episode in the broader, natural history of human (and that word is already 
all-too-human) resentment, judgement and condemnation against life. 
Deleuze says about nihilism: “The will to nothingness [is] the universal […] 
becoming-reactive of forces” (1983, p.69), while Ansell-Pearson similarly characterizes 
it as “the story of the becoming-sick of the human animal” (1997, p.154). Now, it is 
known that Deleuze’s immanent ontology of machinic forces —reading nihilism as 
becoming-reactive and later as autonomized anti-production— goes well with 
Nietzsche’s anti-positivistic, anti-reductionist, extra-moral appropriation of naturalism 
(Emden, 2005; Moore, 2002), yet this is a dimension of Nietzsche’s thinking that 
Heidegger has taught to dismiss as it would breach an ontological difference that 
perhaps never really applied to it. On its part, Blanchot would seem to agree only to 
find as resistant to Heidegger a notion of language whose fragmentary autonomization 
deprives it of having to answer to the unity of meaning, something Heidegger, in the 
end, only saw in the will to power as a failed attempt at overcoming ontology, as if the 
latter, and not the denaturalizing logic of resentment, had been Nietzsche’s concern.  
At the aporetic end of metaphysics that is also the ascent of language, this 
leaves Blanchot’s textual dematerialization of the world —the world of ontology + the 
neutral affirmation outside it that ontology cannot use to its ends— not only as the 
possibility that nihilism and literature are, indeed, closer than it seems, but also in a 
problematic relation to the will to nothingness. At worst, the most passive passivity in 
the face of undecidable ambiguity and unending mourir exposes what happens when 
the becoming-reactive of forces has finished spiritualizing itself in freed writing after 
the death of God, thus “the absolute self-sacrifice of the writer to the negative” 
(Weller, p.87) insinuating itself as a sign of contemporary decadence: the acceptance 
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of defeat and inaction in the face of the blatant success of the will to nothingness49. 
Although one may wonder if the error of presence is truly equal to the interminability 
of death and not, in Nietzschean fashion, to the essence of life as will to illusion —and, 
furthermore, if considering finite life as a state of living dying is not the precise type of 
thing Nietzsche had in mind with nihilism—, we have no interest in developing a 
symptomatical approach to écriture in the strict Nietzschean sense of the type of life 
that wills said experience of interminable death. What is more interesting, in the end, 
is that ontology ends, literature appears as a paradoxical experience of alterity outside 
the grasp of being, and yet nothing really happens except the continuing, relentless 
progression of a reactive will that Nietzsche systematically tried to distinguish from 
(the world as) life-affirmation. Perhaps, indeed, Nietzsche’s insistence in life’s 
denigration by nihilist willing —continuing even after GM described the exhaustion of 
the moral blackmail of Platonism with the self-abolition of the will to truth— deserves 
new attention as naturalist discourses lacking any interest in the epistemological scorn 
post-phenomenological sensibilities throw in the direction of their naïve realisms show 
the logical endgame of ten millennia of lived moral judgements against the world50. 
Rescuing the Nietzsche that Blanchot —following Hegel, Heidegger and Kojève— 
ignored means noting that GM’s central point of the will willing nothingness in order 
not to stop willing shows Nietzsche having always been aware that total life-denial is 
impossible, since it equals suicide. But then the remainder which does not deny in the 
willing of nothingness constitutes the very activity that marks the latter as a —however 
reactive— willing of power51. This implies that GM’s triple distinction determines the 
will to nothingness as a form of nihilism that is not an actual denial of life, but life’s 
history of valuing its own denial. The will to nothingness, therefore, is but suicidal 
nihilism on a much slower and temporarily differed tempo, a self-defeating form of 
power-willing whose very logic is denaturalization, a natural history of nihilism that, 
consequently, also corresponds to the age of man beyond its rather recent relation to 
being, perhaps its very epoch as the anthropocenic deployment of the infinitely 
creative ways it has willed nothingness. And in that case, if the latter term can still be 
said to possess some of the usefulness Nietzsche saw in it, perhaps one might force 
things further and add to it an even cruder image of what this willing has actively 
willed into existence —and here philosophical objections to science’s obsolete ontology 
do nothing against the movement of disintegration that Nietzsche saw as the 
                                                             
49 cf. Zerzan (2008, p.69-95). 
50 cf. BGE 32. 
51 cf. Biswas Mellamphy (2011, p.87). 
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physiological problem of morality—: “‘biotic attrition’, a nice euphemism” (Kolbert, 
2014, p.172). 
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